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Abstract—Gossip protocols (also called rumor spreading or
epidemic protocols) are widely used to disseminate information in
massive peer-to-peer networks. These protocols are often claimed
to guarantee privacy because of the uncertainty they introduce
on the node that started the dissemination. But is that claim
really true? Can one indeed start a gossip and safely hide in the
crowd? This paper studies, for the first time, gossip protocols
using a rigorous mathematical framework based on differential
privacy to determine the extent to which the source of a gossip can
be traceable. Considering the case of a complete graph in which
a subset of the nodes are curious, we derive matching lower
and upper bounds on differential privacy, showing that some
gossip protocols achieve strong privacy guarantees. Our results
reveal an interesting tension between privacy and dissemination
speed: the standard “push” gossip protocol has very weak privacy
guarantees, while the optimal guarantees are attained at the
cost of a drastic increase in the spreading time. Yet, we show
that it is possible to leverage the inherent randomness and
partial observability of gossip protocols to achieve both fast
dissemination speed and near-optimal privacy. These theoretical
results are supported by numerical experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many applications are today distributed and can be deployed
over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network to make them highly
scalable with the number of peers in the system, see for
instance the recent trend in AI and machine learning [1]–
[3]. More generally, P2P networks enable participants to share
information without the need for any central authority. Some
of this information may be sensitive, and people sharing
it may not want to be identified, for instance because of
copyright infringement when sharing music, or in the case
of whistle-blowers. Anonymous sharing platforms can also
help people exercise their right to freedom of expression in
totalitarian regimes. Conversely, it may be important to locate
the source of a (computer or biological) virus, or fake news,
spreading in a network. Therefore, it is crucial to understand
the fundamental limits on privacy and anonymity in P2P
information dissemination.
Gossip protocols (also called rumor spreading or epidemic
protocols), in which nodes randomly choose a neighbor to
exchange information, are both simple and efficient [4]–[7].
They are a basic building block to spread and aggregate
information in distributed databases [8, 9] and social networks
[10, 11], as well as to train machine learning models on
distributed datasets [12]–[15]. A folklore belief is that gossip
protocols guarantee some form of source anonymity because
users cannot know who issued the information in the first place
[16]. Although some work has been devoted to assessing how
efficiently one could locate the source of a gossip in specific
settings [17]–[19], the general anonymity claim has never
been studied from a pure privacy perspective, independently
of any particular attack. Intuitively indeed, random and local
exchanges improve privacy, but to what extent? Given the
importance of privacy and peer-to-peer information dissem-
ination, it is crucial to study the limitations of the anonymity
claim through a principled approach. This is the challenge
we take up in this paper for the classic case of information
dissemination in a complete network graph.
Our first contribution is an information-theoretic model of
anonymity in gossip protocols based on an adaptation of (, δ)-
differential privacy (DP) [20]. Originally introduced in the
database community, DP is a precise mathematical framework
recognized as the gold standard for studying the privacy
guarantees of information release protocols. In our proposed
model, the information to protect is the source of the gossip,
while the attackers are a subset of curious nodes monitoring
the communications they receive and their relative order. Our
notion of DP then requires that the probability of any possible
observation of the attackers is almost the same regardless of
which node is the source. A key aspect of our model is that
the mechanism that seeks to ensure DP comes only from
the natural randomness and partial observability of gossip
protocols, not from additional perturbation or noise which
affects the desired output as generally needed to guarantee DP
[21]. We believe our adaptation of DP to be of independent
interest. We also complement it with a notion of prediction
uncertainty which guarantees that even unlikely events do not
fully reveal the identity of the source under a uniform prior.
This property gives an upper bound on the probability of
success of any source location attack, including the maximum
likelihood estimate.
Based on our proposed model, we then establish matching
upper and lower bounds on the privacy guarantees of gossip
protocols. Essentially, our upper bounds on differential privacy
are obtained by tightly lower bounding the probability that
the node starting the rumor discloses it to the attacker before
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another node does and upper bounding the probability that this
happens for a random node fixed in advance, in a way that
holds for all gossip algorithms. Remarkably, despite the fact
that the source node always has a non-negligible probability to
send its first message to a curious node, our results highlight
the fact that some gossip protocols achieve strong privacy
guarantees in several regimes, including the pure (, 0)-DP
as well as prediction uncertainty. We further show that the
upper bounds on privacy are matched by a gossip protocol
which has very slow spreading time (log-linear in the number
of nodes), highlighting an interesting tension between privacy
and dissemination speed.
To precisely capture this trade-off, we introduce a parame-
terized gossip protocol in which nodes have a fixed probability
to stop emitting after each communication (until they receive
the message again). This gives the protocol the ability to forget
initial conditions, thereby ensuring the privacy of the source.
The standard “push” gossip protocol [5], as well as the afore-
mentioned optimally private but slow protocol, can both be
derived from our parameterized scheme with specific choices
of the parameter. We show that standard gossip protocol is
inherently not differentially private for arbitrarily large graphs,
but that it is possible to devise gossip protocols that are near-
optimally private with spreading time logarithmic in the size of
the graph. We prove the protocol speed by analyzing the mean
dynamics of gossip and leveraging concentration inequalities.
The privacy results are obtained by showing that only a small
fraction of the possible outcomes have different probabilities
when two different nodes start with the gossip. This requires
to precisely evaluate the probability of well-chosen worst-case
sequences, which is generally hard as randomness is involved
both when nodes decide to stop sending messages and when
they choose who to communicate with.
We support our theoretical findings by a series of numerical
experiments on our parameterized gossip protocol, measuring
its empirical spreading time and robustness to source location
attacks. Crucially, the results highlight the importance of
differential privacy guarantees in withstanding attacks that
leverage background information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first
discuss related work and formally introduce our model of
differential privacy for gossip. Then, we give matching upper
and lower bounds on the privacy guarantees of gossip, and
present a privacy-optimal but slow protocol. This leads us
to investigate how to control the trade-off between speed
and privacy. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments and
conclude by discussing open questions.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Gossiping
The idea of disseminating information in a distributed
system by having each node push messages to a randomly cho-
sen neighbor, initially coined the random phone-call model,
dates back to even before the democratization of the internet
[5]. Such protocols, later called gossip, epidemic or rumor
spreading, were for instance applied to ensure the consistency
of a replicated database system [8]. They have gained even
more importance when argued to model information spreading
in social networks [10]. Gossip protocols can also be used to
compute aggregate queries on a database distributed across the
nodes of a network [9, 22], and have recently become popular
in federated machine learning scenarios [23] to optimize cost
functions over data distributed across a large set of peers [12]–
[15]. Gossip protocols differ according to their interaction
schemes, i.e., pull or push, sometimes combining both [6]. In
this work, we focus on the classical push form in the standard
case of a complete graph.
B. Locating the Source of the Rumor
Determining the source of a gossip is an active research
topic, especially given the potential applications to social
networks, see [17] for a recent survey. Existing approaches
have focused so far on building attacks that compute or
approximate the maximum likelihood estimate of the source
given some observed information. Each approach typically
assumes a specific kind of graphs (e.g., trees, small world,
etc.), dissemination model and observed information. In rumor
centrality [19], the gossip communication graph is assumed to
be fully observed and the goal is to determine the center of
this graph to deduce the node that started the gossip. Another
line of work studies the setting in which some nodes are
curious sensors that inform a central entity when they receive
a message [18]. Gossiping is assumed to happen at random
times and the source node is estimated by comparing the
different timings at which information reaches the sensors. The
proposed attack is natural in trees but does not generalize to
highly connected graphs. The work of [24] focuses on hiding
the source instead of locating it. The observed information is
a snapshot of who has the rumor at a given time. A specific
dissemination protocol is proposed to hide the source but the
privacy guarantees only hold for tree graphs.
We emphasize that these works derive privacy guarantees
(i.e., the probability not to be detected) that only hold un-
der the specific attacks considered therein. Furthermore, all
approaches rely on maximum likelihood and hence assume a
uniform prior on the probability of each node to be the source.
The guarantees would thus break if the protocol was run twice
from the same source, or if the attacker knew that some of the
nodes could not have started the rumor.
C. Differential Privacy
While we borrow ideas from the approaches mentioned
above (e.g., we assume that a subset of nodes are curious
sensors as in [18]), our work differs fundamentally for we
aim at studying the fundamental limits of any source location
protocol independently of specific attacks, by evaluating the
amount of information that is released during a gossip scheme.
For this purpose, a general and robust notion of privacy is
required. Differential privacy [20, 21] has emerged as a gold
standard for it holds independently of any assumption on the
model, the computational power, or the background knowledge
that the attacker may have. Differentially private protocols
have been proposed for numerous problems in the fields
of databases, data mining and machine learning: examples
include computing aggregate and linear counting queries [21],
releasing and estimating graph properties [25, 26], clustering
[27], empirical risk minimization [28] and deep learning [29].
In this work, we consider the classic version of differential
privacy which involves two parameters , δ ≥ 0 that quantify
the privacy guarantee [30]. More precisely, given any two
databases D1 and D2 that differ in at most one row,1 a (ran-
domized) information release protocol P is said to guarantee
(, δ)-differential privacy if for any possible output S:
p(P(D1) ∈ S) ≤ ep(P(D2) ∈ S) + δ. (1)
Parameter  places a bound on the ratio of the output prob-
abilities when changing one entry of the database, while
parameter δ is assumed to be small and allows the bound
to be violated with small probability. When  = 0, δ gives
a bound on the total variation distance between the output
distributions, while δ = 0 recovers the “pure” -differential
privacy. DP guarantees hold regardless of the attack and are
robust against strong background knowledge that the attacker
may have about the records of the database (in particular,
the attacker may know all records in D1 and D2 except the
differing ones). In our context, the background information
could be the knowledge that the source is among a subset of
all nodes. Robustness against such background knowledge is
crucial in some applications, for instance when sharing secret
information that few people could have known and leaked
in the first place. Another important feature of differential
privacy is composability: if (, δ)-differential privacy holds for
a release protocol, then querying this protocol two times about
the same dataset satisfies (2, 2δ)-differential privacy. This is
important for rumor spreading as it enables to quantify privacy
when the source propagates multiple rumors that the adversary
can link to the same source (e.g., due to the content of the
message). We will see in Section VI that these properties are
essential in practice to achieve robustness to several attacks.
Existing differentially private protocols typically introduce
additional perturbation (also called noise) to hide critical in-
formation [21]. In contrast, an original aspect of our work is to
solely rely on the natural randomness and limited observability
brought by gossip protocols to guarantee differential privacy.
III. A MODEL OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY FOR GOSSIP
PROTOCOLS
Our first contribution is a precise mathematical framework
for studying the fundamental privacy guarantees of gossip
protocols. We define the family of protocols we consider, their
inputs and the outputs observed by the attackers during the
execution of a protocol, as well as the privacy notions we
consider. In the following, we consider a complete graph with
n nodes labeled from 0 to n− 1.
1This is a slight abuse of terminology common in the literature. Strictly
speaking, it should be called (, δ)-indistinguishability [30].
A. Gossip Protocols
To specify the class of protocols we consider in this paper,
we first define a key communication primitive. Denoting by
I the set of informed nodes, tell_gossip(i, I) allows
an informed node i ∈ I to tell the information to an-
other node j ∈ {0, ..., n − 1} chosen uniformly at random.
tell_gossip(i, I) returns j (the node that received the
message) and the updated I (the new set of informed nodes
that includes j). Equipped with this primitive, we can now
formally define the class of gossip protocols.
Definition 1 (Gossip protocols). A gossip protocol on a
complete graph is one that (a) terminates almost surely, (b)
ensures that at the end of the execution the set of informed
nodes I is equal to {0, ..., n− 1}, and (c) can modify I only
through calls to the tell_gossip primitive.
B. Inputs and Outputs
As recalled in Section II-C, differential privacy is a prob-
abilistic notion that measures the privacy guarantees of a
protocol based on the variations of its output distribution for
a change in its input. In this paper, we adapt it to our gossip
context. We first formalize the inputs and outputs, in the case
of a single piece of information to disseminate (multiple pieces
can be addressed through composition, see Section II-C). At
the beginning of the protocol, a single node has the information
(the gossip, or rumor). This node defines the input of the gossip
protocol, and it is the actual “database” that we want to protect.
In this sense, the input database has n rows, each with a binary
attribute equal to 1 for the source node and 0 for other nodes.
We define the output of a gossip protocol as the information
disclosed to an attacker during the execution of the protocol.
In this work, we focus on attackers that can monitor a set of
curious nodes C of size f , i.e. they observe all communications
involving a curious node. This model, previously introduced
in [18], is meaningful in large distributed networks: while it
is unlikely that an adversary can observe the full state of the
network at any given time, compromising or impersonating a
subset of the nodes appears more realistic. More formally,
a gossip protocol generates an ordered sequence Somni of
triplets (t, i, j) of calls to tell_gossip where t counts the
number of times the tell_gossip primitive has been called
(starting from t = 0), i is the node on which tell_gossip
was used and j the node that was told the information. This
sequence corresponds to the output that would be observed by
someone who could eavesdrop on all communications. Since
the attacker only monitors a subset of the nodes, through
the (random) execution of the protocol it gathers a (random)
subsequence S = ((i, j)|(t, i, j) ∈ Somni, j ∈ C). In other
words, the attacker only has access to the relative order in
which the information has been disclosed to curious nodes
as it is oblivious to tell_gossip calls among non-curious
nodes. In particular, the attacker does not know how many
messages were sent in total at a given time. Note that because
we focus on complete graphs, knowing which curious node
received the rumor gives no information on the starting node.
For a given output sequence S, we write St = i to denote that
the t-th tell_gossip call in S originates from node i.
The ratio f/n of curious nodes determines the probability of
the attacker to gather information. In particular, for a fixed f ,
the attacker only becomes weaker as the network grows bigger.
Since we would like to study attackers with fixed power, unless
otherwise noted we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The ratio of curious nodes f/n is constant.
C. Privacy Definitions
Now that we have precisely defined the inputs and outputs
of gossip protocols, we formally introduce our privacy defi-
nitions. To ease notations, we denote by I0 the source of the
gossip (the set of informed nodes at time 0), and for any given
i ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}, we denote by pi(E) = p(E|I0 = {i}) the
probability of event E if node i is the source of the gossip. The
protocol is therefore abstracted in this notation. Recalling that
S is the set of all possible outputs of the information release
procedure, we say that a gossip protocol is (, δ)-differentially
private if:
pi(S) ≤ epj(S) + δ, ∀S ⊂ S, ∀i, j ∈ {0, ..., n− 1}, (2)
where p(S) is the probability that the output belongs to the set
S. This formalizes a notion of source indistinguishability in the
sense that, with high probability, any output is almost as likely
to be observed by the attackers regardless of who started the
gossip (“nothing bad will happen with high probability”). Note
however that when δ > 0, this definition allows a protocol
to release the identity of the source with small probability.
To capture the fact that “nothing too bad will ever happen”,
we favor DP protocols that also guarantee the complementary
notion of c-prediction uncertainty: there exists a constant c >
0 such that for a uniform prior p(I0) on source nodes and any
i ∈ {0, ..., n− 1}:
p(I0 6= {i}|S)/p(I0 = {i}|S) ≥ c, (3)
for any S ⊂ S such that pi(S) > 0. Prediction uncertainty
guarantees that no observable output S can identify a node
as the source with large enough probability, ensuring that
the probability of success of any source location attack is
upper bounded by 1/(1 + c). This holds in particular for the
maximum likelihood estimate. Prediction uncertainty does not
have the robustness of differential privacy against background
knowledge, as it assumes a uniform prior on the source. While
it can be shown that (, 0)-DP with  > 0 implies prediction
uncertainty, the converse is not true. Indeed, prediction uncer-
tainty is satisfied as soon as no output identifies any node with
enough probability, without necessarily making all pairs of
nodes indistinguishable as required by DP. We will show that
prediction uncertainty allows to rule out some naive protocols
that have nonzero probability of generating sequences which
reveal the source with certainty. Thanks to the symmetry of
our problem, we consider without loss of generality that node
0 starts the rumor (I0 = {0}) and therefore we will only need
to verify Equations (2) and (3) for i = 0 and j = 1.
Remark 1 (Model extensions). We have kept our model
relatively simple to avoid unnecessary technicalities in the
derivation and presentation of our results. For completeness,
we discuss the impact of possible extensions (e.g., information
observed by attackers, malicious behavior, termination crite-
rion) in Appendix A.
IV. OPTIMAL PRIVACY
In this section, we study the fundamental limits of gossip in
terms of privacy. Our main result is a set of tight bounds on the
privacy guarantees that can be achieved by gossip protocols.
We first state and discuss these bounds, and then present the
optimally private gossip protocol that matches our bounds and
discuss its properties.
A. Matching Upper and Lower Bounds on Privacy
We now prove limits on the differential privacy and predic-
tion uncertainty guarantees of any gossip protocol in the sense
of Definition 1, and show that these bounds are matched by a
concrete protocol.
Theorem 1. If a gossip protocol satisfies (, δ)-differential
privacy for any  ≥ 0 and c-prediction uncertainty, then we
have δ ≥ fn
(
1− e−1f
)
and c ≤ nf+1 − 1. Furthermore,
these bounds are tight and matched by Algorithm 1 when its
parameter is set to s = 0.
To prove this theorem, we introduce a useful technical
fact which directly follows from the definition of differential
privacy and is at the heart of our lower bound proofs. Fact 1
means that proving a lower bound on the differential privacy
parameters can be achieved by finding a set of possible outputs
S (here, a set of ordered sequences) that is more likely if node
0 starts the gossip than if node 1 does. It is a direct application
of the definition of differential privacy.
Fact 1. Given any gossip protocol, let S ⊂ S and w0, w1 ∈ R
be such that w0 ≤ p0(S) and p1(S) ≤ w1. If the protocol
satisfies (, δ) differential privacy then δ ≥ w0 − ew1.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Lower Bound Part). We prove here the
fundamental limits on privacy and defer the proof of the
matching bounds to Section IV-B. Since tell_gossip
requires that the input node i is in I and that at the beginning,
I = {0}, the first time the procedure is called must be on
node 0. The procedure is called at least once otherwise the
protocol terminates with I = {0}, violating the conditions of
Definition 1. We denote by S(0) the set of output sequences
such that S0 = 0 (i.e., 0 is the first to communicate with
a curious node). We also denote by T c0 the event such that
the starting node does not communicate with a curious node
for its first communication. We note tc the time of first
communication with a curious node. Conditionally upon T c0 ,
the node that started the gossip is at least as likely as any other
node to emit the second message, because with probability 1n
it is the only node with the rumor after the first message is
sent. Since the probability to hit a curious node is the same
regardless of who sends the message, we have for all i, j /∈ C:
pj(S0 = i|T c0 ) ≤ pj(S0 = j|T c0 ). From this inequality we get∑
i/∈C
p0(S0 = 0|T c0 ) ≥
∑
i/∈C
p0(S0 = i|T c0 ) = 1
≥
∑
i/∈C
p0(S0 = 1|T c0 ),
where the equality comes from the fact that S0 is the first
node that communicates with a curious node (and the curious
nodes do not start with the information). The second inequality
comes from the fact that pj(S0 = i|T c0 ) = pj(S0 = k|T c0 ) for
all i, k different from j. Therefore, we have p0(S0 = 0|T c0 ) ≥
1
n−f and p0(S0 = 1|T c0 ) ≤ 1n−f .
Combining the above expressions, we derive the probability
of S(0) when 0 started the diffusion:
p0
(
S(0)
)
= p0
(
S(0), tc = 0
)
+ p0
(
S(0), T c0
)
= p0 (tc = 0) p0
(
S(0)|tc = 0
)
+ p0
(
S(0)|T c0
)
p0 (T
c
0 )
≥ f
n
× 1 + 1
n− f
(
1− f
n
)
=
f
n
+
1
n
.
We then do the same split if node 1 initially has the message,
but in this case p1
(
S(0)|tc = 0
)
= 0 and we get p1(S(0)) =
p1(T
c
0 )p1(S
(0)|T c0 ) ≤ 1n . We conclude again by Fact 1.
The upper bound on prediction uncertainty is derived using
the same quantities. More precisely:
p(I0 6= 0|S(0))
p(I0 = 0|S(0)) =
∑
i/∈C∪{0}
pi(S
(0))
p0(S(0))
≤ (n− f − 1)p1(S
(0))
p0(S(0))
≤ (n− f − 1) 1
f + 1
=
n
f + 1
− 1.
Note that we have never assumed that curious nodes knew
how many messages were sent at a given point in time. We
have only bounded the probability that the source is the first
node that sends a message to curious nodes.
Theorem 1 shows that some gossip protocols are able to
provide strong privacy guarantees. In the regime where  =
0 (where DP corresponds to the total variation distance), δ
cannot be smaller than the proportion of curious nodes. This
is rather intuitive since the source node has probability at least
f/n to send its first message to a curious node. Remarkably,
however, one can also achieve differential privacy with δ much
smaller than f/n by trading-off with  > 0. In particular, the
pure version of differential privacy (δ = 0) is attained for
 ≈ log f , which provides good privacy guarantees when the
number of curious nodes is not too large. Furthermore, even
though the probability of disclosing some information is of
order f/n, attackers always have a high probability of making
a mistake in their attempt to locate the source, as shown by
the prediction uncertainty guarantee.
Crucially, these privacy guarantees are made possible by
the natural randomness and partial observability of gossip
protocols. In Appendix C, we show that for a stronger (but un-
realistic) attacker with access to the total number of messages
exchanged in the network at any given time, the guarantee in
total variation distance still holds but it becomes impossible
to achieve prediction uncertainty and pure differential privacy
because this attacker can identify the source with certainty
when the very first message is sent to a curious node.
B. Optimally Private Gossip
We now discuss the gossip protocol that matches the bounds
of Theorem 1, which turns out to be very simple: nodes for-
ward the message to exactly one random neighbor when they
receive it and then stop emitting until they receive the message
again. This protocol, which we refer to as private gossip, is a
special case of the general protocol given in Algorithm 1 when
its parameter is set to s = 0 (see discussion in Section V).
Private gossip is similar to the protocol introduced by [24] in
the sense that at each time step, the source changes and it is
quickly impossible to recover which node started the gossip (as
initial conditions are quickly forgotten). Private gossip ensures
that (i) the gossip does not die before all nodes are informed,
(ii) the state of the system (the set informed nodes I) after
the first message is sent is completely independent from the
source, and (iii) all nodes follow the same behavior. The first
property ensures that the protocol falls within Definition 1, the
second one is key to match the optimal privacy parameters
stated in Theorem 1, and the third one prevents the source to
be identified due to a special behavior, in contrast to the naive
alternative described below.
Remark 2 (Delayed start gossip). A naive alternative to
the private gossip protocol is as follows: the source node
transmits the rumor to a random node and forgets it, then a
fast gossip protocol (such as Algorithm 1 with s = 1) may start
normally from the node that received the information. While
this delayed start gossip achieves optimal differential privacy
in some regimes, it is fundamentally flawed. In particular, it
does not guarantee prediction uncertainty in the sense that
c → 0 as the graph grows. Indeed, attackers can identify the
source with high probability by detecting that it communicated
only once and then stopped emitting for many rounds. We refer
to Appendix D for details.
We now prove the second part of Theorem 1, i.e. that our
bounds are indeed matched by the private gossip protocol.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Matching Privacy Guarantees). For this
protocol, the only outputs that have a different probability if
node 0 starts (compared to the case when 1 starts) are those in
which 0 (or 1) communicates with a curious node at time 0.
Following our previous notations, we write these two events
S0 = 0 and S0 = 1 and further denote by S(0) (resp. S(1)) the
set of output sequences such that S0 = 0 (resp. S0 = 1). We
denote by T0 the event such that node 0 communicates with
a curious node (and T c0 the negation of this event) and write:
p0(S0 = 0) = p(T0)p0(S0 = 0|T0) + p(T c0 )p0(S0 = 0|T c0 ).
For any i /∈ C where C is the set of curious nodes, we have
that p0(S0 = 0|T c0 ) = p0(S0 = i|T c0 ) = 1n−f . Indeed, given
T c0 , the node that received the first message was selected
uniformly at random among non-curious nodes, and has the
same probability to disclose the gossip at future rounds.
Plugging into the previous equation, we obtain:
p0(S0 = 0) =
f
n
+
(
1− f
n
)
1
n− f =
f + 1
n
.
For any other node i 6= 0, p0(S0 = i) = p0(T c0 )p0(S0 =
i|T c0 ) = 1n because p0(S0 = i|T0) = 0. Combining these
results we get p0(S(0)) ≤ ep1(S(0)) + δ for any  > 0 and
δ = fn (1− e
−1
f ). By symmetry, we make a similar derivation
for S(1), which concludes the proof.
To prove the prediction uncertainty result, we use the
differential privacy result with e = f + 1 (and thus δ = 0)
and write that for any S ∈ S:
p(I0 6= 0|S)
p(I0 = 0|S) =
∑
i/∈C∪{0}
pi(S)
p0(S)
≥ (n−f−1)e− = n
f + 1
−1.
An obvious drawback of the private gossip protocol is
that it is very slow in practice, since only one node can
transmit the rumor at any given time. To precisely quantify
its dissemination speed, one can observe that it performs a
random walk on the complete graph. Therefore, the number
of gossip operations needed to inform all nodes can be reduced
to the time needed for the classical coupon collection problem:
it takes O(n log n) communications to inform all nodes with
probability at least 1 − 1/n [31]. As the private gossip
protocol performs exactly one communication at any given
time, it needs time O(n log n) to inform all nodes with high
probability. This is much slower than the standard “push”
gossip protocol in which all informed nodes can transmit
the rumor in parallel, requiring only time O(log n) [4]. This
motivates the exploration of the privacy-speed trade-off. In
the next section, we introduce gossip protocols with O(log n)
speed and nearly optimal privacy.
V. FASTER PRIVATE GOSSIP
In this section, we study faster variants of the private gossip
protocol in which nodes do not necessarily stop emitting after
they first transmit the information. Algorithm 1 describes a
class of gossip protocols parameterized by s ∈ [0, 1], which fits
Definition 1. They maintain a set A of active nodes (initialized
to the source node) which spread the rumor asynchronously
and in parallel: this is modeled by the fact that at each step
of the algorithm, a randomly selected node i ∈ A invokes the
tell_gossip primitive to send the information to another
node (which in turn becomes active), while i also stays active
with probability s. This protocol, illustrated in Figure 1, can
be understood as a gossip protocol with a randomized version
of fanout [32].2 It is also related to the SIS epidemic model
2Unlike in classic fanout, nodes start to gossip again each time they receive
a message instead of deactivating permanently.
[33] but here the rumor never dies regardless of the value
of s ∈ [0, 1] (i.e., there always remain some active nodes).
Parameter s controls the trade-off between privacy and speed:
in particular, s = 0 recovers the private gossip protocol
(optimal privacy) and s = 1 recovers the standard “push”
gossip protocol (optimal speed).
In the rest of this section, we study how parameter s of
Algorithm 1 impacts its privacy guarantees and its dissemina-
tion speed. We first establish that the privacy guarantees of the
standard gossip protocol (s = 1) must be arbitrarily bad for
large graphs. Then, we show that nearly optimal privacy can
be achieved for smaller s. Finally, we study the dissemination
speed and show that the known logarithmic diffusion time of
the standard gossip protocol also holds for s > 0, leading to
a sweet spot in the privacy-speed trade-off.
A. Standard “Push” is not Differentially Private
The way the optimal protocol works suggests that gossip
protocols need to forget initial conditions quickly in order
to be private. In this section, we strengthen this intuition by
showing that the differential privacy guarantees of the standard
“push” gossip protocol (corresponding to Algorithm 1 with
s = 1) become arbitrarily bad as the size of the graph increases
(keeping the fraction of curious nodes constant).
Theorem 2. If Algorithm 1 with s = 1 guarantees (, δ)-DP
for all values of n and constant  <∞, then δ = 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Intuitively, the proof relies on the fact
that the event “node 0 communicates with a curious node
before node 1 gets the message” becomes more and more
likely as n grows, hence preventing any meaningful differential
privacy guarantee when n is large enough. More specifically,
we study S(0)r , the set of output sequences such that the rank of
node 0 in the sequence is less than r. For a specific sequence to
not be in S(0)r , there must have been at least r communications
(because r nodes must have communicated with curious
nodes), and none of them involved 0 and a curious node.
Therefore, if we note nc(r) the number of communications
that actually happened before the output sequence reached size
r, we have nc(r) ≥ r. Then, denoting by C(t) the node that
communicated with a curious node at time t (with C(t) = −1
when the communication did not involve a curious node):
p0(S
(0)
r ) = 1− p
(
∩nc(r)t=0 C(t) 6= 0
)
= 1−
nc(r)∏
t=0
p (C(t) 6= 0) ≥ 1−
r∏
t=0
(
1− f
n
1
t
)
,
where the last step comes from the fact that the probability
of node 0 to be selected at time t is 1|It| ≥ 1t because at
most one node is informed at each step and the active node
is selected uniformly among informed nodes. We use the fact
that log(1 + x) ≤ x for any x > −1 on x = − fn 1t to get:
r∏
t=0
(
1− f
n
1
t
)
= e
∑r
t=0 log(1− fn 1t ) ≤ e− fn
∑r
t=0
1
t . (4)
Algorithm 1 Fast Private Gossip
Require: n {Number of nodes}, k {Source node}, s
{Probability for a node to remain active}
Ensure: I = {0, . . . , n− 1} {All nodes are informed}
1: I ← {k}, A← {k}
2: while |I| < n do
3: Sample i uniformly at random from A
4: A← A \ {i} with probability 1− s
5: j, I ← tell_gossip(i, I), A← A ∪ {j}
6: end while
step 1 step 2
step 3
step 1
step 1
step 2
step 2
Fig. 1: Left: Fast Private Gossip. Right: Illustration of the role of parameter s. S indicates the source and C a curious node.
Green nodes know the rumor, and red circled nodes are active. When s = 0, there is only one active node at a time, which
always stops emitting after telling the gossip. The resulting protocol (private gossip) is private but slow. In the case s = 1,
nodes always remain active once they know the rumor, leading to a fast but non private protocol (this is the standard push
gossip protocol [5]). When 0 < s < 1, each node remains active with probability s after each communication, providing a
trade-off between privacy and speed.
Therefore, p0(S
(0)
r ) goes to 1 as r goes to infinity. We
emphasize that we do not need to fix any network size for this
result to hold since the ratio f/n is assumed to be constant.
Then, for a given r and for any k > 0, p(nc(r) ≤ k)
is equal to p(Binom(k, fn ) ≥ r) where Binom(k, fn ) is the
binomial law of parameters k and fn . This is because it is
the probability of having exactly r successes with the sum of
less than k Bernoullis of parameter fn , which is equal to the
probability of having more than r successes with the sum of
k Bernoullis of the same parameters. Therefore, p(nc(r) ≤ k)
is independent of n and we can choose k∗ independently of
n such that p(nc(r) > k∗) ≤ 1n . Then, we write that
p1(S
(0)
r ) = p0(S
(0)
r , nc(r) ≤ k∗) + p0(S(0)r , nc(r) > k∗)
≤ p0(S(0)r |nc(r) ≤ k∗) +
1
n
.
This implies p0(S
(0)
r |nc(r) ≤ k∗) ≤ p0(0 ∈ Ir|nc(r) ≤
k∗) ≤ 1 − p(0 /∈ Ir|nc(r) ≤ k∗). We know that only r
communications have reached curious nodes but the others
have reached a random node in the graph, and there is at most
k∗ of them, so finally:
p1(S
(0)
r ) ≤ 1− (1−
1
n
)k
∗
+
1
n
.
We immediately see that p1(S
(0)
r ) goes to 0 as n grows
because k∗ is independent of n, and we have shown above
that p0(S
(0)
r ) goes to 1 as n grows. Since we must have that
p0(S
(0)
r ) ≤ ep1(S(0)r ) + δ, we must have δ = 1 if we want δ
and  to be independent of n.
B. Privacy Guarantees of Fast Private Gossip
The previous section clearly highlights the fact that the
standard gossip protocol (s = 1) is not differentially private.
We now show that giving nodes the possibility to stop emitting
by setting s < 1 is enough for the protocol to have non-trivial
privacy guarantees.
Theorem 3. For 0 < s < 1 and any fixed r ∈ N∗, Algorithm 1
with parameter s guarantees (0, δ)-differential privacy with:
δ = 1−(1−s)
∞∑
k=0
sk
(
1− f
n
)k+1
≤ 1−(1−sr)
(
1− f
n
)r
For example, choosing r = 1 leads to δ ≤ s + (1 − s) fn .
Tighter bounds can be obtained, but this is enough already to
recover optimal guarantees as s→ 0.
Proof. The proof of this theorem requires looking at very
specific sequences and events that need to be picked carefully.
In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between two types
of sequences. If S is such that node 1 communicates with a
curious node before node 0, then p0(S) ≤ p1(S) because node
0 needs to receive the rumor before being able to communicate
it to curious nodes.
Suppose now that S is such that node 0 communicates with
a curious node before node 1. In this case, we denote by F the
event such that the source (in this case node 0) communicates
with a curious node before stopping to emit for the first time.
We recall that this happens with probability 1−s after each call
to the tell_gossip procedure. It is interesting to remark
that in this case, p0(S|F¯ ) ≤ p1(S|F¯ ). Indeed, if node 1 is the
source then node 0 can communicate with a curious node as
soon as it receives the rumor. If node 0 is the source then
because of F it has to stop emitting before being able to
communicate with a curious node. Therefore, conditionally on
F , it is more likely that node 0 communicates with a curious
node before node 1 does if node 1 is the source rather than if
node 0 is the source. Then, we can write:
p0(S) = p0(S, F¯ ) + p0(S, F ) ≤ p1(S, F¯ ) + p0(F )
≤ p1(S) + p0(F ).
Then, denoting by Tf the number of messages after which
the source stops emitting, we write for s > 0:
p0(F ) =
∞∑
k=1
p0(Tf = k)p0(F |Tf = k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− s)sk
(
1−
(
1− f
n
)k+1)
.
Note that we can also write for k ≥ 1:
p0(F ) = p0(F, Tf ≤ k) + p0(F, Tf > k)
≤ (1− sk)
(
1−
(
1− f
n
)k)
+ sk
= 1− (1− sk)
(
1− f
n
)k
,
which concludes the proof.
Theorem 3 proves a (0, δ)-differential privacy result, which
means that apart from some unlikely outputs that may disclose
the identity of the source node, most of them actually have
the same probability regardless of which node started the
diffusion. The guarantee we obtain here holds for any graph
with fixed proportion f/n of curious nodes.
The differential privacy guarantees given by Theorem 3
and the optimal guarantees of Theorem 1 are of the same
order of magnitude when s is not too large. In particular,
we numerically established that the ratio between the two is
less than 2 for all s ≤ 0.5. This indicates that the privacy
guarantees are very tight in this regime. Note that setting r = 1
in Theorem 3 leads to an additive gap of s(1− f/n) between
the privacy of Algorithm 1 and the optimal guarantee, showing
that one can be as close as desired to the optimal privacy
as long as s is chosen close enough to 0. We also recover
exactly the optimal guarantee of Theorem 1 in the case s = 0
(without the ability to control the trade-off between  and
δ). Importantly, we also show that Algorithm 1 with s < 1
satisfies prediction uncertainty, unlike the case where s = 1.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 guarantees prediction uncertainty
with c = (1− f+1n )(1− s).
Proof. For any set of sequences S ⊂ S such that p0(S) > 0:
p(I0 6= 0|S)
p(I0 = 0|S) =
∑
i/∈C∪{0}
pi(S)
p0(S)
≥
∑
i/∈C∪{0}
pi(A1 = {0})pi(S|A1 = {0})
p0(S)
,
where A1 is the set of active nodes at round 1. Because
the state of the system (active nodes) is the same in both
cases we can write that pi(S|A1 = {0}) = p0(S). Besides,
pi(A1 = {0}) corresponds to the probability that node i sends
a message to node 0 and then stops emitting. Therefore:
p(I0 6= 0|S)
p(I0 = 0|S) ≥
(
1− f + 1
n
)
(1− s) > 0.
C. Dissemination Speed
We have shown that parameter s has a significant impact on
privacy, from optimal (s = 0) to very weak (s = 1) guarantees.
Intuitively, s also impacts the dissemination speed: the larger
s, the more active nodes at each round. This is highlighted by
the two extreme cases, for which the speed is already known
and exhibits a large gap: O(log n) for s = 1 [4] while it is only
O(n log n) when s = 0. To establish whether we can obtain a
protocol that is both private and fast, we need to characterize
the dissemination speed for the cases where 0 < s < 1.
The key result of this section is to prove that the logarithmic
speed of the standard “push” gossip protocol holds more
generally for all s > 0. This result is derived from the fact that
the ability to forget does not prevent an exponential growth
phase. What changes is that the population of active nodes
takes approximately 1/s rounds to double instead of 1 for
standard gossip. For ease of presentation, we state below the
result for the synchronous version of Algorithm 1, in which
the notion of round corresponds to iterating over the full set A.
A similar result (with an appropriate notion of rounds) can be
obtained for the asynchronous version given in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 5. For a given s > 0, there exists α > 0 such
that for all C > 0, there exists n large enough such that
the synchronous version of Algorithm 1 with parameter s
sends at least Cn log n messages in Cα−1 log n rounds with
probability at least 1− 1/n.
Proof. The key argument of the proof is that the gossip process
very closely follows its mean dynamics. After a transition
phase of a logarithmic number of rounds, a constant fraction
of the nodes (depending on s) remains active despite the
probability to stop emitting after each communication. This
“determinism of gossip process” has been introduced in [34],
but their analysis only deals with the case s = 1. Our proof
takes into account the nontrivial impact of nodes deactiva-
tion in the exponential and linear growth phase. Besides,
we introduce and analyze a last phase, showing that with
high probability the population never drops below a critical
threshold of active nodes. Due to the lack of space, the proof
can be found in Appendix E.
Theorem 5 shows that our parameterized gossip protocol
with s > 0 still achieves a logarithmic spreading time even if
nodes can stop transmitting the message. Note that the constant
α depends on s and will go to infinity as s→ 0 because 1/s
rounds are needed in expectation to double the population of
active nodes (even without taking collisions into account).
To summarize, we have shown that one can achieve both
fast spreading and near-optimal privacy.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present some experiments to evaluate the
empirical dissemination speed of the fast gossip algorithm as
well as its practical robustness to attacks in different scenarios.
(a) Fraction of informed nodes (b) Fraction of active nodes
Fig. 2: Effect of parameter s of Algorithm 1 on the spreading time for a network of n = 216 nodes. The curves represent
median values and the shaded area represents the 10 and 90 percent confidence intervals over 100 runs. Each curve stops when
all nodes are informed (and so the protocol terminates), except for s = 0 since the protocol is very slow in this case.
(a) Attack precision under prior information on the source (b) Attack precision when the source spreads multiple rumors
Fig. 3: Effect of parameter s of Algorithm 1 on the precision of source location attacks for a network of n = 216 node with
10% of curious nodes. Precision is estimated over 15,000 random runs.
A. Dissemination Speed
To complement Theorem 5 (which proves logarithmic
spreading time in the asymptotic regime), we run simulations
on a network of size n = 216. The logarithmic spreading time
of Algorithm 1 for s > 0 is clearly visible in Figure 2a, where
we can see that the gossip spreads almost as fast for s = 0.5 as
it does for s = 1. Even for small s, it remains much faster than
the slow private gossip (s = 0). The results in Figure 2b further
confirm that the fraction of active nodes grows exponentially
fast for all values of s > 0 and then reaches a plateau when
the probability of creating a new active node is compensated
by the probability of message collisions (informing an already
active node). Empirically, this happens when the fraction of
active nodes is of order s, meaning that the last phase (during
which the remaining uninformed nodes need to be reached
by a stable number of s × n active nodes) remains short.
We note incidentally that gossip protocols are often praised
for their robustness to lost messages [35, 36]. While the slow
private gossip protocol does not tolerate a single lost message,
fast private gossip with s > 0 is more resilient thanks to the
linear proportion of active nodes. The latter property makes
it unlikely that the fast gossip protocol stops because of lost
messages as long as s is larger than the probability of losing
messages. Of course, the protocol remains somewhat sensitive
to messages lost during the first few steps.
B. Robustness Against Source Location Attacks
While differential privacy is challenging to directly eval-
uate experimentally, we can measure the robustness of our
fast private gossip protocol against concrete source location
attacks. In particular, to illustrate the practical relevance of the
differential privacy guarantees, we consider two challenging
scenarios where the attacker has some background knowledge:
either 1) prior knowledge that the source belongs to a subset
of the nodes, or 2) side information that the same source
disseminates multiple rumors.
1) Prior knowledge on the source: We first consider the
case where the adversary is able to narrow down the set
of suspected nodes. In this case we can design a provably
optimal attack, as shown in the following theorem (proof in
Appendix F).
Theorem 6. Assume that curious nodes have a uniform prior
over a subset P of nodes, i.e., p(I0 = i) = p(I0 = j) for
all i, j ∈ P and p(I0 = i) = 0 for i /∈ P . Let S be an
output sequence, and tc such that Stc ∈ P and St /∈ P for all
0 ≤ t < tc. Then p(I0 = Stc |S) ≥ p(I0 = i|S) for all i.
Theorem 6 means that under a uniform prior over nodes in
P , the attack in which curious nodes predict the source to be
the first node in P that communicates with them corresponds
to the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimator. The set P
represents the side information of the attacker, who knows for
sure that some nodes cannot be the source.
Figure 3a shows the precision of this attack as a function
of s for varying degrees of prior knowledge. We see that,
when s is small, the prior knowledge does not improve the
attack precision significantly, and that the precision remains
very close to the probability that the source sends its first
message to a curious node. This robustness to prior knowledge
is consistent with the properties of differential privacy (see
Section II-C). On the contrary, when s is high (i.e., differ-
ential privacy guarantees are weak), the impact of the prior
knowledge on the precision of the attack is much stronger.
2) Multiple dissemination: We investigate another scenario
where differential privacy guarantees can provide robustness,
which is when the attacker knows that the same source
node disseminates multiple rumors. In this setting, analytically
deriving an optimal attack is very difficult. Instead, we design
an attack which leverages the fact that even though the source
is not always the first node to communicate with curious nodes,
with high probability it will be among the first to do so. More
precisely, the attack is as follows. The curious nodes record
the 10 first nodes that communicate with them in each gossip
instance,3 and predict as the source the node that appears in
the largest number of instances. In case of a tie, the curious
nodes choose the node that first communicated with them, with
ties among instances broken uniformly at random. Figure 3b
shows that the precision of this attack increases dramatically
with the number of rumors when s is large, reaching almost
sure detection for 10 rumors. Remarkably, for small values of
s, the attack precision increases much more gracefully with the
number of rumors, as expected from the composition property
of differential privacy discussed in Section II-C. We see that
meaningful privacy guarantees can still be achieved as long as
the number of rumors spread by the source is not too large.
3The results are not very sensitive to this choice.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper initiates the formal study of privacy in gos-
sip protocols to determine to which extent the source of a
gossip can be traceable. Our contributions are the following:
(1) We proposed a formal model of anonymity in gossip
protocols based on an adaptation of differential privacy; (2)
We established tight upper bounds on the privacy of gossip
protocols, highlighting their natural privacy guarantees; (3)
We precisely captured the trade-off between privacy and speed
with a parameterized gossip protocol allowing nodes to stop
gossiping after some time, showing that it is possible to design
both fast and near-optimally private gossip protocols; (4) We
experimentally evaluated the speed of our protocols and their
robustness to various attacks, highlighting the relevance of our
formal differential privacy guarantees in practical scenarios.
Our work opens several interesting perspectives. In par-
ticular, it paves the way to the study of differential privacy
guarantees for gossip protocols in general graphs, which is
a very challenging problem that requires to introduce some
relaxations of differential privacy in order to obtain nontrivial
guarantees. We refer to Appendix B for a discussion of these
open questions.
Another exciting avenue for future research is motivated
by recent work showing that hiding the source of a message
can significantly amplify differential privacy guarantees for
the content of the message [37]. However, primitives to hide
the source of messages such as onion routing can be difficult
and costly to deploy. Showing that gossiping can naturally
amplify differential privacy for the message contents would
make gossip protocols very desirable for privacy-preserving
distributed AI applications, such as those based on federated
[23] and decentralized machine learning [38].
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APPENDIX
A. Model Extensions
We have kept our model relatively simple to avoid unneces-
sary complexity in the notations and additional technicalities
in the derivation and presentation of our results. In this
section, we briefly discuss some possible extensions. Our main
point is to illustrate the fact that they will generally lead to
some technical complications without impacting the privacy
guarantees significantly.
1) Pull and Push-Pull Protocols: Our study focuses on the
classic push form of gossip protocols. This can be justified
by the fact that, for regular graphs, synchronous push has
asymptotic spreading time guarantees that are comparable with
the push-pull variant [39]. Besides, the differential privacy
guarantees of any gossip protocol are limited by the probability
that the first node informed by the source is a curious node,
and we show this bound can be matched with push protocols.
Nevertheless, extensions of our results to pull and push-pull
variants of gossip protocols [6] are possible. Forgetting mech-
anisms similar to the ones in Algorithm 1 can be introduced
for these protocols, i.e. nodes would have a probability 1− s
to stop disclosing information after each time they are pulled
(if they do not pull someone with the information in between).
Although slightly different, the optimal privacy guarantees
would remain of the same order of magnitude. Yet, we expect
pull guarantees to be much worse in the case s = 1 because
curious nodes could stop suspecting all nodes that they have
pulled and that did not have the rumor. Besides, the pull
protocol for s = 0 would be even slower than its push
counterpart.
2) Eavesdropping Adversary: Since we consider a com-
plete graph, our formalization of the attackers as a fraction f/n
of curious nodes is closely related to an eavesdropping attacker
who would observe each communication with probability f/n.
Indeed, both models consider that each communication has a
probability f/n of being disclosed to the attacker. Most of our
results are thus easily transferable to this alternative setting.
The only difference would be that all nodes can be suspected
in the eavesdropping model, thus introducing a (1 − f/n)−1
factor each time we consider the population of non-curious
nodes.
3) Information Observed by Attackers: We discuss two pos-
sible generalizations of the output observed by the attackers.
a) Messages sent by curious nodes: For simplicity of
exposition, we consider that curious nodes only observe mes-
sages that are sent to them and not the messages that they send.
However, including the messages sent by curious nodes in their
observed output would not impact the bounds on privacy (i.e.,
the guarantees for the algorithms). For the optimal algorithm,
we only consider what happens during the first round, so
including the messages sent by curious nodes does not change
the result. This in particular implies that the fundamental limits
of Theorem 1 remain the same (since the attackers observe
strictly more information). Similarly, for the parameterized
algorithm, Theorem 3 is obtained by bounding the probability
of a set Sˆ. Then, we have p(Sˆ, Sout) ≤ p(Sˆ) where Sout
is the sequence of messages sent by the curious nodes. In
general, adding the messages sent by curious nodes to the
output sequences has little or no impact on the results.
b) Message ordering: We assume that the relative order
of messages is preserved in the output sequence observed by
curious nodes. This could be relaxed, as in practical scenarios
a message sent before another may well be received after it.
One could for instance introduce a random swapping model
to take this into account and investigate whether this weaker
output leads to an improvement in the privacy guarantees.
However, we argue that this improvement would be quite
limited. First of all, it would not affect the privacy guarantees
of the optimal protocol: since there is a single active node
able to send a message at any given time, swapping is not
possible. Furthermore, even when several nodes are active at
the same time (e.g., in Algorithm 1 with s > 0), the proofs
can be adapted to work with counting the messages received
instead of the messages sent. In this case, swapping is as likely
to expose the source (making its messages arrive earlier) than
to hide it (delaying the messages it sends). Therefore, privacy
would not improve substantially.
4) Malicious Behavior: In this work, we have assumed for
simplicity that nodes are curious but not malicious, i.e., they
follow the protocol. This is motivated by a practical scenario
where a subset of nodes are simply being monitored by a
curious entity. If curious nodes can also act maliciously, they
have three possible ways to affect the protocol: emitting more,
emitting less, or not choosing neighbours uniformly at random.
If they emit more, they will inform more nodes, which makes it
more difficult for them to locate the source. If they emit less
(potentially not at all), then in the case s < 1 the protocol
could stop before all nodes are informed. Yet, the privacy
bounds are derived from the fact that the source forgets the
information before communicating to a curious node. If they
choose the neighbors they send the messages to, it reduces to
the case in which they emit less (because they do not send
messages to uninformed nodes) but without affecting protocol
speed or termination (because it does not reduce the number
of active nodes). Thus, the impact on the observed output and
therefore on the privacy would be minimal. In the case s = 1,
malicious nodes have slightly more impact but remain quite
small as it only makes the set of informed nodes grow slightly
slower.
5) Termination Criterion: For simplicity, in all our gossip
protocols we have used a global termination criterion (the
protocol terminates when all nodes are informed). Termination
without using global coordination is a problem in its own
right that has been extensively studied (see for instance [6]).
Although some termination criteria could have a great impact
on privacy, we argue that termination can be handled late in
the execution so as to reveal very little about the beginning,
hence avoiding any significant impact on privacy. For instance,
it is possible to design a variant of Algorithm 1 in which
nodes only flip a coin with probability s for a fixed number
of times, and then stop emitting completely. This fixed number
would have to depend on s, but then if it is large enough, it
would guarantee both termination and privacy. Indeed, nodes
would not communicate with curious nodes each time they
are activated with high probability so this counter would
actually provide very little information to the curious nodes.
Determining how large this number of iterations should be, and
the exact impact on privacy (which we argue is very small),
is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Challenges of Private Gossip for General Graphs
A natural extension of this work is to consider general
graphs. We discuss in this section several aspects related to
the natural privacy of gossip protocols in arbitrary graphs. In
particular, we highlight the fact that problem-specific modeling
choices are needed to go beyond the complete graph, and that
even defining a notion of privacy that is suitable for all graphs
is very challenging.
1) Average-Case versus Worst-Case Privacy: Unlike the
case of complete graphs, the location of curious nodes crit-
ically impacts the privacy guarantees in arbitrary graphs. A
naive way to deal with this issue is to randomize the location
of curious nodes a posteriori. Let us denote by Lfi,j the set
containing all subsets of nodes of size f of the graph that do
not contain i and j. For fixed nodes i and j, the set of curious
nodes C is drawn from U(Lfi,j), the uniform distribution over
Lfi,j . For some parameters , δ ≥ 0, privacy can be defined as
follows: ∀i, j ∈ {0, ..., n− 1}, ∀S ∈ S
EC∼U(Lfi,j)[pi(S, C)− e
pj(S, C)] ≤ δ.
Note that pi(S, C) = 0 if the output sequence S is not
compatible with the set of curious nodes C, i.e. if (k, l) ∈ S
and k, l /∈ C. To pick the curious nodes, it is possible to either
pick a set of f curious nodes at once or to pick each node
(except for i and j) with probability f/n. This randomized
definition allows to prove a bound similar to that of Theorem 1
for arbitrary graphs. Indeed, the first node that receives the
rumor has probability fn of being a curious node. However,
such average-case notions of privacy are highly undesirable:
in this case, no protection is provided against a (much more
realistic) adversary that controls a fraction of nodes fixed in
advance.
The worst-case approach consists in bounding the maximum
difference instead of the expectation. This is the approach
taken in our work for the complete graph (the max operator
is implicit because the location of curious nodes does not
matter in a complete graph). In the case of general graphs,
the corresponding privacy definition is given by: ∀i, j ∈
{0, ..., n− 1}, ∀S ∈ S,
max
C∈Lfi,j
[pi(S, C)− epj(S, C)] ≤ δ.
We immediately observe that with this definition, it is impos-
sible to have δ < 1 as soon as there is a node in the graph with
less than f neighbors. This modeling choice is quite unrealistic
as well because having a node surrounded by curious nodes
means that the attacker actually believes this specific node
has a strong probability of being the source and therefore put
more sensors around it. A possible alternative would be to
place curious nodes so as to bound the maximum privacy for
any pair of nodes, and then evaluate the minimum privacy in
this setting. This definition would mean that the attacker wants
to be able to distinguish any pair of nodes as best as possible.
We see that choosing the locations of the curious nodes in an
arbitrary graph is a complex problem that is heavily dependent
on the topology of the graph and on the prior of the attacker
on the locations of the curious nodes. Indeed, the attacker may
simply want to isolate a sufficiently small group of nodes that
have a high probability of being the source.
2) Relaxing the Differential Privacy Definition: Differential
privacy is a very strong notion that enforces indistinguishabil-
ity between all pairs of nodes, in order to be robust to any prior
information about who might be the source. In particular, an
attacker should not be able to precisely identify the source
even if it knows that only two nodes in the graph can be the
source. Although it was possible to obtain meaningful privacy
guarantees of this kind for the complete graph, this appears to
be too strong of a requirement for some graph topology and
location of curious nodes. Consider for instance the extreme
case of a line graph. It is clear that any non-trivial attacker
can always distinguish between two segments of the line. This
intuition directly extends to any graph which admits a cut with
only curious nodes in it.
A natural idea is to restrict the pairs of nodes that are
required to be indistinguishable. Several ways of doing this
may be considered. For instance, one could require that each
node is indistinguishable from k other nodes in the graph.
Such relaxed definition could be obtained using the Pufferfish
framework [40], which explicitly provides a notion of secret to
protect. But how to choose such k nodes based on the topology
and how to characterize the optimal locations of curious nodes
is very challenging. Another direction could be to adapt the
notions of metric-based differential privacy [41, 42] to design
a notion of privacy where the required indistinguishability for
a given node is a function of its distance to curious nodes
in the graph, or to require that pairs of nodes become less
indistinguishable with distance in the graph. Yet, it is not clear
how to characterize the influence of the graph topology.
3) Optimality of Private Gossip: We have seen in this
section that the privacy guarantees for arbitrary graphs heavily
rely on the particular privacy notion and that some recent
privacy frameworks may provide tools to relax the classic
differential privacy definition which is generally too strong
for arbitrary graphs. We conjecture that for some of these
relaxed definitions, the optimal algorithm for general graphs
will be the same as in our case of the complete graph. Indeed,
the strength of the private gossip protocol (Algorithm 1 with
s = 0) is to forget initial conditions quickly. In the complete
graph, it does so in one step. In an arbitrary graph, the
information about the part of the graph the source belongs to is
still present after some steps, but the source should quickly be
completely indistinguishable from its direct neighbors. In par-
ticular, attacks based on centrality [19], are rather meaningless
against this algorithm because spreading only occurs along a
random walk in the graph. Our fast private gossip protocol is
likely to enjoy near-optimal privacy guarantees since it is an
approximation of the private gossip protocol.
C. Privacy Guarantees in the Case of a Strong Attacker
In our model, we assume that curious nodes only have
access to the relative ordering in which they received the
messages but they have no information on the global time
at which it was sent. We briefly discuss here how the privacy
guarantees are affected if one considers a stronger attacker
that has access to the number of times the tell_gossip
procedure has been called. Formally, this attacker observes
the sequence S = ((t, i, j) ∈ Somni|j ∈ C). Note that this is
not a realistic attacker as gossip protocols naturally enforce
partial observability of the events, but the point is to study the
influence of the timing information on the privacy guarantees.
The following result quantifies the limits of privacy for this
stronger adversary, which can be compared to the results of
Theorem 1 in the main text. We can see that in the regime
 = 0 (total variation distance), the limits remain the same.
However, achieving δ < f/n and prediction uncertainty is not
possible against this stronger adversary.
Theorem 7. If a gossip protocol satisfies (, δ)-differential
privacy and c-prediction uncertainty then we have δ ≥ fn and
c = 0 in the strong attacker setting. Furthermore, these bounds
are tight and matched by Algorithm 1 when its parameter is
set to s = 0.
Proof. The fact that tell_gossip is called at least once
and is first called on node 0 still holds. Sequence S(0) now
denotes the fact that node 0 communicates with a curious node
at time 0. Since the protocol is run on the complete graph, the
node selected by tell_gossip is chosen uniformly within
{0, ..., n − 1}, so a curious node is selected with probability
f
n . We thus have p0(S
(0)) = fn . Besides, node 0 cannot
communicate with a curious node at time 0 if node 1 starts the
rumor so p1(S(0)) = 0. We conclude by Fact 1. For prediction
uncertainty, using the same sequence S(0) yields pi(S
(0))
p0(S(0))
= 0
for all i 6= 0 and therefore c = 0.
It remains to show that these bounds are matched by the
same private gossip protocol. The fact that the only outputs
that have a different probability if node 0 starts (compared
to the case when 1 starts) are those in which 0 (or 1)
communicates with a curious node for its first communication
is still true with the stronger attacker. Then, we write p0(S0 =
0) = p1(S0 = 1) =
f
n and p0(S0 = 1) = p1(S0 = 0) = 0.
This ensures that p0(S(0)) ≤ p1(S(0))+ fn (similarly for S(1)),
and the result follows.
D. Delayed Start Gossip
Consider the protocol described in Remark 2, that we call
delayed start gossip:
1. The source calls tell_gossip once to transmit the
rumor to an arbitrary node, say node j.
2. Node j then starts a standard gossip (Algorithm 1 with
s = 1).
This simple protocol is clearly optimal from the point of
view of differential privacy in the regime  = 0 (total variation
distance) because if the first communication does not hit a
curious node then the probability of a given output when two
different nodes start the gossip is the same. It is also fast since
it runs the standard gossip after the first round.
Yet, this naive protocol has a major flaw. Indeed, when
the first communication hits a curious node, the attackers can
monitor whether the sender communicates with them again in
the next rounds. If it does not, they can guess that the node
is the source, and they will in fact make a correct guess with
probability arbitrarily close to 1 for large enough graphs. On
the other hand, when the sender communicates again with a
curious node shortly after, they can be very confident that
this node is not the source. Hence, it is possible to design a
very simple attack with a very high precision (almost always
right) and almost optimal recall (finds the source every time
the information is actually released, i.e. with probability fn ).
Making sure that the attacker is uncertain about its predic-
tion is therefore a desirable property. This is captured by the
notion of prediction uncertainty that we introduce with the
model. The following proposition formalizes the above claims
and motivates the need for more involved protocols such as
the faster private gossip protocol of Algorithm 1.
Proposition 1. We call cds the prediction uncertainty constant
of the delayed start protocol and we assume the ratio of
curious nodes f/n to be constant. Then cds → 0 when
n→∞.
More generally, it is in principle possible to prove similar
results for any protocol in which the source node does not
behave like other nodes. Indeed, if the special behaviour can
be detected, then attackers can know for sure the source of
the rumor.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof reuses some elements of
the proof of Theorem 2. We consider the sequence S(0)r such
that node 0 is the first node to communicate with a curious
node (S0 = 0) and then r other nodes communicate with
curious nodes before 0 does (Si 6= 0 for i ∈ {1, ..., r}).
We denote by t0 the time at which node 0 gets the message
and becomes active again (we refer here to the global order,
although of course the curious nodes do not have access to it).
Then, with the usual notations we have:
p0
(
S(0)r
)
= p0(S0 = 0)p0
(
S(0)r |S0 = 0
)
≥ f
n
p0 (∩ri=1Si 6= 0|S0 = 0)
≥ f
n
p0(t0 ≥ r)
≥ f
n
p0(nc(r) ≤ k∗)p0(t0 ≥ r|nc(r) ≤ k∗).
Then, we recall from the proof of Theorem 2 that
p0(nc(r) ≤ k) = p
(
Binom(k,
f
n
) ≥ r
)
= p
(
Binom(k, 1− f
n
) < k − r
)
= 1− p
(
Binom(k, 1− f
n
) ≥ k − r
)
,
so if we set k = 2nf r and use tail bounds on the binomial
law (Theorem 1 of [43]) then there exists a constant H (only
depending on fn ) such that:
p0(nc(r) ≤ r2n
f
) ≥ 1− e−rH .
Therefore, we have:
p0
(
S(0)r
)
≥ f
n
(
1− e−rH)(1− 1
n
)r 2fn
≥ C1(r, n). (5)
The last line comes from calculations done in the proof of
Theorem 2. We now study p1(S
(0)
r ). Since node 1 started the
protocol then it means that no other node (and in particular
0) will stop emitting the message. Therefore, if node 0 is the
first to communicate with a curious node then it will remain
active for the whole duration of the protocol. Consider that
the first disclosure happens after Tf communications. We can
write:
p1
(
S(0)r
)
≤ p1(S0 = 0)p1 (∩ri=1Si 6= 0|S0 = 0, Tf ≤ tf )
+ p1(Tf > tf ).
Since the fraction of curious nodes is constant, we can
choose tf independently of n or r such that p(Tf > tf ) ≤
e−
f
n tf ≤ 4(n−f) if tf = nf log
(
4(n−f)

)
in order to control
the second term. Then,
p1 (∩ri=1Si 6= 0|S0 = 0, Tf ≤ tf ) ≤
tf+r∏
t=tf
(
1− f
n
1
t
)
≤ e−
f
n
∑tf+r
t=tf
1
t .
A series-integral comparison yields that if r = log2(n) then
e
− fn
∑tf+r
t=tf
1
t ≤ 4 for n large enough. Finally, we use the fact
that p1(S0 = 0) ≤ 1n−f to write that:
p1
(
S(0)r
)
≤ 
2(n− f) . (6)
Finally, we observe that C1(log2 n, n) → fn when
n → ∞ where C1 is defined in Equation 5. In particular,
C1(log
2 n, n) ≥ f2n for n large enough, so we have
p(I0 6= 0|S(0)r )
p(I0 = 0|S(0)r )
=
∑
i/∈C∪{0}
pi(S
(0)
r )
p0(S
(0)
r )
≤ n
f
. (7)
Since  can be picked arbitrarily small and nf is assumed
to be constant then the previous ratio can be made arbitrary
small.
E. Diffusion speed
Proof of Theorem 5. The idea of this proof is to rely on
the “determinism” of gossip process, similarly to [34]. This
means that the gossip process very closely follows its mean
dynamics. In our case, there is an added difficulty in the
fact that extra randomness is introduced by the deactivation
of the nodes. Yet, we precisely quantify the impact of this
phenomenon on the results. We start by showing that if more
than k(s) nodes are informed at a given time, then with very
high probability the number of informed nodes never drops
below this fraction once it is reached. Therefore, a number
of messages proportional to the size of the graph is sent at
each round. The condition on s for this to happen is written
in Equation (12). More formally, we fix s ∈ (0, 1] and denote
by At the number of nodes that are active at round t, which
is such that At = αtn. Then, we note
f : α→ 1− pu(α)(1− αs), (8)
where pu(α) = (1 − 1n )αn. Note that f(α) can be rewritten
f(α) = 1nE[At+1−At|At = αn]. As a matter of fact, for each
node, the probability of getting the message is exactly 1 −
pu(α) so n (1− pu(α)) nodes get the message in expectation.
The rest of the active nodes at the following round is made
of the nodes that were active, did not receive the message and
did not deactivate, which represents a portion nαpu(α)s of
the nodes. Then, one can see that the function f is simply
the sum of these 2 terms. We show by using that (1− x)y ≤
e−xy ≤ 1− xy + x2y22 that for α ≤ αs = s1+2s , we have:
f(α) ≥
(
1 +
s
2
)
α. (9)
Then, we follow the same steps as in Lemma 15 in [34]. We
call At the number of active nodes at round t, and At,m the
number of active nodes at round t after m messages have
been sent (so during the round). Then, we can define Xi =
At,i+1 −At,i. At,i+1 only depends on At,i and so does Xi:
Xi =
{ 1 with proba s(1− |At,i|n )
−1 with proba (1− s) |At,i|−1n
0 otherwise
Then, we define the martingale Zi =
E[
∑At
i=1Xi|X1, · · · , Xi, At]. This allows us to write
At+1 − nf(α) = ZAt − Z0. If we call Sk,t =
∑At
i=kXi then
for any d ∈ {−1, 0, 1}:
E[S1,t|X1, , Xi, Xi+1 = 1, At]
≥ E[S1,t|X1, · · · , Xi, Xi+1 = d,At]
≥ E[S1,t|X1, · · · , Xi, Xi+1 = −1, At],
because the distribution of Xi only depends on At,i. Therefore,
|Zi+1−Zi| ≤ (1+E[Si+1,t|At+1])−(E[Si+1,t|At−1]−1)] ≤
2. Azuma’s inequality [44] then gives:
p
(
At+1 − nf(At
n
)
)
≤ −λAt|At = k) ≤ e−λ
2k
8 . (10)
We also have that p(At+1 < k|At ≥ k) ≤ p(At+1 ≤ k|At =
k). Then, for any α ≤ αs we have that p(At+1 < k|At ≥ k) ≤
p(At+1−nf(Atn ) ≤ − s2At|At = k) by using Equation 9. We
can then bound this expression by using Equation 10 with
λ = s2 . Therefore, we need that:
α ≤ αs. (11)
Denoting by Nk,j the number of messages sent between
rounds k and j, we can decompose over Cα−1 log n rounds
so that if m is such that there are at least α active nodes at
round m then:
p(Nm,m+Cα−1 logn ≥ Cn log n) ≥ (1− e−
s2αn
32 )Cα
−1 logn,
because it is equal to the probability that the fraction of active
nodes never goes below α for Cα−1 log n rounds. Therefore,
if
s2 ≥ 32
αn
log
3Cn log n
α
, (12)
then p(Nm,m+Cα−1 logn ≥ Cn log n) ≥ 1− 13n .
Equation 12 gives a lower bound on the value of α. Note
that this lower bound goes to 0 as n grows so in particular,
Equation 12 is satisfied for α = αs if n is large enough. It
now remains to show that such a fraction α of active nodes
can be reached in logarithmic time. Usual gossip analysis
takes advantage of the exponential growth of the informed
nodes during early rounds for which no collision occur. We
have to adapt the analysis to the fact that nodes may stop
communicating with some probability and split the analysis
into two phases.
In the rest of the proof, we prove that a constant fraction of
the nodes (independent of n) can be reached with a logarithmic
number of rounds. We first analyze how long it takes to go
from O(log n) to O(n) active nodes and then from 1 to
O(log n).
Equation 9 along with Equation 10 with λ = s4 give that as
long as At0(1 +
s
4 )
t ≤ αsn then
p
(
At+t0+1 ≥ At0(1 +
s
4
)t+1|At = At0(1 +
s
4
)t
)
≥ 1− e−αns
2
128
for any t ≥ t0 such that At0
(
1 + c2
)t ≤ nαs . Therefore,
if we do this for all t ≤ tα = log(αn)log(1+ s4 ) rounds (so for a
logarithmic number of rounds) then p (Atα+t0 ≥ nα|At0) ≥(
1 − e−
At0
s2
128
)tα because in this case, At ≥ At0 for t ≥ t0.
Therefore, if
At0 ≥ −
128
s2
log
(
1−
(
1− 1
3n
) 1
tα
)
, (13)
then p(Atα+t0 ≥ nα) ≥ 1 − 13n . If we use the fact that
(1− x)y ≤ e−xy ≤ 1 − xy + x2y22 to simplify Equation 13,
we can show that if At0 satisfies:
At0 ≥
128
s2
(
log n+ log(3tα)− log
(
1− 1
6ntα
))
, (14)
then it also satisfies Equation 13. Since the terms on the
right hand side are dominated by log n, for n large enough, a
sufficient condition for Equation 13 to hold is:
At0 ≥
256
s2
log n. (15)
It only remains to prove that a logarithmic number of
nodes can be reached in logarithmic time. For this, we use
again Azuma inequality but we start from the very beginning
of the protocol (|A0| = 1) and for a fixed sequence of
m messages. This time, we write Sn =
∑m
i=1Xi with
the exact same notations, and by calling A0,m the number
of actives nodes after m messages (without taking rounds
into account) then p(A0,m − a ≤ −λ) ≤ e− λ
2
8m for any
a ≤ E[Sn]. Then, we denote Ei the event such that Xi ≥ 0
for all i and write that E[Sn] ≥ p(Ei)E[Sn|Ei]. Considering
that A0,m ≤ m, we can write that E[Sn] ≥ (1 − (1 −
s)mn )
mms(1−mn ). Therefore, we can apply Azuma inequality
with λ = ms
(
1
2 − mn [(1− s)m− 1]
)
, which yields:
p(A0,m ≤ ms
2
) ≤ e−ms
2
8 (
1
2−mn [(1−s)m−1])
2
. (16)
The number of messages sent during rounds 1 to t0 is at
least equal to m ≥ t0. We set t0 = 512s3 log(3n), and since for
n large enough we have mn [(1− s)m− 1] ≤ 14 , then
p
(
At0 ≥
256
s2
log(n)
)
≥ 1− e− m˜s
2
128 ≥ 1− 1
3n
. (17)
We conclude the proof by noting that
p
(
N0,t0+tα+Cα−1 logn ≥ Cn log n
) ≥
p
(
At0 ≥
256
s2
log n
)
p
(
Atα+t0 ≥ nα|At0 ≥
256
s2
log n
)
p
(
Ntα+t0,tα+t0+Cα−1 logn ≥ Cn log n|Anα ≥ α
)
≥
(
1− 1
3n
)3
≥ 1− 1
n
.
The number of rounds is logarithmic since both t0 and tα
depend logarithmically on n.
Remark 3 (Extension to the Asynchronous Version). The
first part of the proof directly extends to the asynchronous
algorithm by simply considering slices of time during which a
set of αn nodes send αn messages, which essentially means
constant time. Then, we consider a logarithmic number of
slices. The phase from 1 to O(log n) active nodes requires
sending a logarithmic number of messages and can thus
be done in logarithmic time. Finally, phase 2 (going from
O(log n) to O(n) active nodes) consists in evaluating a
logarithmic number of rounds during which a logarithmic
number of nodes are active. Again, the only important thing is
the number of messages sent (and not which node sent them)
so using constant time intervals ensures that enough messages
are sent between each pseudo-rounds with high probability.
Therefore, it is possible to prove a statement very similar
to that of Theorem 5 in the asynchronous setting, where the
notion of rounds is replaced by constant time intervals. We
omit the exact details of this alternative formulation.
F. Proof of Theorem 6
We recall that S is the output sequence observed by curious
nodes, so that S0, is the first node that communicates with a
curious node. The source is noted I0, as it is the first node
informed of the rumor. The set P is such that p(I0 = i) = 0
if i /∈ P . Recall that tc is such that Stc ∈ P and St /∈ P for
0 ≤ t < tc. By a slight abuse of notation, note At the set of
active nodes at the time where St is disclosed (time of t-th
communication with a curious node), so St ∈ At for all t.
We know that for all i ∈ P then p((St)t<tc |Atc , I0 =
i) = p((St)t<tc |Atc) since St /∈ P for t < tc. Similarly,
p((St)t≥tc |Atc , I0 = i, (St)t<tc) = p((St)t≥tc |Atc) since the
output after some time only depends on the active nodes at that
time. Therefore, p(S|Atc , I0 = i) = p(S|Atc) for all i ∈ P ,
which critically relies on the fact that tc is the time of first
disclosure of a node in P (the first inequality would not hold
otherwise). We note [n] = {1, ..., n}. We then write for i ∈ P :
p(I0 = i|S) =
∑
A⊂[n]
p(Atc = A|S)p(I0 = i|Atc = A,S)
=
∑
A⊂[n]
p(Atc = A|S)p(I0 = i|Atc = A)
=
∑
A⊂[n]:Stc∈A
p(Atc = A|S)
p(I0 = i)
p(Atc = A)
p(Atc = A|I0 = i).
Let j ∈ P ∩ Atc . If i ∈ Atc then p(Atc =
A|I0 = i) = p(Atc = A|I0 = j). Otherwise, let us
denote Eij(A) = ∩k∈A\{j}{k active at time tc} ∩k/∈A∪{i}
{k inactive at time tc}. This event represents the realization
of Atc for all nodes different from i and j. We then write:
p(Atc = A|I0 = i) = p(∩k∈A{k ∈ Atc} ∩k/∈A {k /∈ Atc}|I0 = i)
= p(Eij(A)|I0 = i)p(j ∈ Atc , i /∈ Atc |I0 = i, Eij(A))
= p(Eij(A)|I0 = j)p(j ∈ Atc , i /∈ Atc |I0 = i, Eij(A))
≤ p(Eij(A)|I0 = j)p(j ∈ Atc , i /∈ Atc |I0 = j, Eij(A)))
= p(Atc = A|I0 = j).
The inequality comes from the fact that it is more likely
that j is active and i is inactive if j is the source than if i
is (i.e., if it is already the case at the beginning). This means
that p(Atc = A|I0 = i) ≤ p(Atc = A|I0 = j) for all i ∈ [n]
and j ∈ Atc . Since the summation is over all A such that
S0 ∈ A (by definition of Stc and Atc ), and p(Atc = A|I0 =
i) ≤ p(Atc = A|I0 = Stc), we have for all considered A:
p(I0 = i|S)
=
∑
A⊂[n]:Stc∈A
p(Atc = A|S)
p(I0 = i)
p(Atc = A)
p(Atc = A|I0 = i)
≤
∑
A⊂[n]:Stc∈A
p(Atc = A|S)
p(I0 = Stc)
p(Atc = A)
p(Atc = A|I0 = Stc)
= p(I0 = Stc |S).
This means that Stc is more likely to be the source than
any other suspected node when the attackers observe output
S. Note that this requires uniform prior over nodes that can be
suspected since we used the fact that p(I0 = i) = p(I0 = Stc)
for all i ∈ P . For i /∈ P , p(I0 = i|S) = 0 ≤ p(I0 = Stc |S).
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